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I have thought long and hard about my choice of the heretical
title for this lecture-"Hayekian Socialism." In retrospect, the obvious
reason for rejecting this title is to avoid a manifest injustice to one of
the most articulate opponents of socialism of the twentieth century.
His short essay, The Use of Knowledge in Society,1 offers a lucid account of
the social function of the price system which is as fresh today as the
day it was written. His earlier writings on the "socialist calculation"
debate showed that central planners could not coordinate the frag-
mentary and incomplete information that allows markets to generate
a set of prices even when individuals are largely ignorant of the alter-
native uses to which scarce goods could be put.2 The strength of
Hayek's views can only be captured in relation to the positions he was
forced to refute, such as the proposal for the creation of a Supreme
Economic Council to set the prices of all factors of production.
3
In the end, and notwithstanding the power of Hayek's destructive
critique, I decided to stick with this title for the less weighty reason
that it draws into public view one strand of Hayek's thought that is
inconsistent with his overall intellectual orientation. On balance, I
have decided that it would be better to use a title that to some will
sound like an oxymoron, than to suppress the one discordant strand
in Hayek's overall thought. I trust that Hayek's many admirers will
recognize that I have chosen the title to provoke some useful reflec-
tion on Hayek's life, not to stir unnecessary animosity or controversy.
* James Parker Hall Distinguished Service Professor, The University of Chicago.
B.A., Columbia College; B.A., Oxford University; LL.B., Yale Law School. This Article is an
extended and revised version of the Gerber Lecture delivered at the University of Mary-
land School of Law on March 11, 1998.
1. F.A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. EcON. REV. 520 (1945).
2. See, e.g., F.A. Hayek, Socialist Calculation: The Competitive 'Solution,' 8 ECONOMICA
(New Series) 125 (1940).
3. Id. at 134. The two works targeted by Hayek are 2 OSKAR LANGE & FRED M. TAYLOR,
ON THE ECONOMIC THEORY OF SOCIALISM: GOVERNMENT CONTROL OF THE ECONOMIC ORDER
(Benjamin E. Kippincott ed., 1938) and H.D. DICKINSON, ECONOMICS OF SOCtALISM (1939).
Lange and Taylor at least had the sense to call the central planning agency the Central
Planning Board. Hayek, for obvious rhetorical purposes, preferred the more grandiose
title of the S.E.C., no relation to our Securities and Exchange Commission.
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Oddly enough, however, it is possible to be too diffident about
my mission. Hayek was no stranger to controversy. Born in Vienna in
1899, he completed his studies both in law and in economics-which
is not to say that he studied law-and-economics, as we now know it-
during the early 1920s.4 He migrated to England around 1930 and
shortly thereafter became a charter member of that great band of
economists who worked and taught at the London School of Econom-
ics during the 1930s.' His own market instincts found a congenial
home in his professional circumstances, even though the clear drift of
English political thought moved smartly in favor of more extensive
government regulation through central planning. Hayek's most fa-
mous work, The Road to Serfdom,6 first published in 1944, was written as
a popular response to this social trend, and marks the turning point in
Hayek's intellectual life from professional economist to political econ-
omist. It is largely in the latter capacity that he is known today.
The Road to Serfdom generated instant controversy. Some review-
ers praised the book as a kind of intellectual Magna Carta. For its
time, The Road to Serfdom gave a clear and incisive account of all that
had gone and would go wrong in the modern English social welfare
state-free individuals under planning would be reduced to a condi-
tion but one step above slavery.7 The enthusiastic response to the
American edition of the book showed that its readers could easily
transpose his arguments into an attack on the economic portions of
Roosevelt's New Deal with its constant effort to cartelize markets in
agriculture, labor, and industrial production. But Hayek did not re-
ceive a hero's welcome in all quarters, for The Road to Serfdom was as-
sailed by others as the most reactionary, vile, vicious, intemperate, and
unwise publication to hit the streets of England for a long, long time:
People who enjoyed vigorous democratic institutions could not be
called serfs in their own time.8 Both sides to the debate shared the
4. SeeJOHN GRAY, HAYEK ON LIBERTY 141 (1984).
5. See Arthur Shenfield, Friedrich A. Hayek: Nobel Prizewinner, in EssAYs ON HAYEK app.
at 171, 173 (Fritz Machlup ed., 1976).
6. FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM (1944) [hereinafter HAYEK, THE ROAD
TO SERFDOM].
7. See Henry Hazlitt, An Economist's View of 'Planning,'N.Y. TIMES BOOK REVIEW, Sept.
24, 1944, at I (reviewing HAYEK, THE RoAD TO SERFDOM) ("[Hayek] tries to point out how
socialism by its very nature must be anti-liberal and anti-democratic, and how national
'planning' can seem to be successful only as it progressively removes all freedom of choice
from the individual.").
8. See, e.g., HERMAN FINER, ROAD TO REACTION at ix, xii (1945) (describing The Road to
Serfdom as "the most sinister offensive against democracy to emerge from a democratic
country for many decades" and criticizing Hayek because his "apparatus of learning is defi-
cient, his reading incomplete[,] . . .his understanding of the economic process . . .big-
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common ground that Hayek advocated a smaller government and a
larger private sector.' Without question, that is the view that he put
forward in his other works, most notably The Constitution of Liberty,' °
and thereafter, his three-volume set Law, Legislation and Liberty." He
was the self-proclaimed arch enemy of socialism, and all his abstract
political theory was written with a most practical end in mind-to
overthrow the dominant mind set in England and elsewhere. So the
question may be fairly set: If Hayek's intellectual pedigree is as clear
as protagonists on both sides of the debate assume, then why pour oil
onto troubled waters with the title, "Hayekian Socialism"?
My motivation is simple. In order to understand the evolution of
political theory, it is important to identify the strands of socialist
thought in Hayek that with time have become the mainstays of the
political left. Hayek's effort to find some common ground with his
opponents led him to make unwise concessions to the benevolent use
of state power. Of course, Hayek did not conceive of himself as the
champion of the expansion of government power; nor has he ever
been construed that way by friend or foe. But nonetheless, his sub-
stantive positions helped to make respectable the growth of state
power in the post-World War II era. Quite simply, Hayek was pre-
pared throughout his political writings to accept some claim for mini-
mum welfare rights for all individuals, even as he attacked centralized
planning on the one hand and industry-specific protectionism on the
other. The size and importance of that concession can be best under-
stood first by setting out Hayek's general orientation, and then by iso-
lating the unmistakable, if unintended, socialist elements found in his
oted, his account of history false[,] . ..his political science is almost nonexistent, his
terminology misleading, his comprehension of British and American political procedure
and mentality gravely defective[,] and . . .his attitude to average men and women ...
truculently authoritarian"). But see, e.g., BARBARA WOOrON, FREEDOM UNDER PLANNING
(1946) (criticizing the views put forth by Hayek in The Road to Serfdom while still expressing
appreciation for the man). Hayek singled out Finer's critique as "a specimen of abuse and
invective which is probably unique in contemporary academic discussion." Preface to the
1956 Paperback Edition of THE ROAD TO SERFDOM, reprinted in F.A. HAYEK, THE RoAD TO
SERFDOM at xxx n.4 (fiftieth anniv. ed. 1994). Note that Hayek had far greater praise for
Wootton's book. See id. at xxix n.1.
9. See 3 FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY:. THE POLITICAL ORDER OF
A FREE PEOPLE 36, 41-64 (1979) [hereinafter 3 HAYEK, LAw, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY] (ar-
guing that government power "ought always to be ... confined to the administration of a
sharply circumscribed range of means entrusted to its care" and outlining the limited
scope of legitimate activities that government may undertake).
10. F.A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY (1960) [hereinafter HAYEK, THE CONSTI-
TUTION OF LIBERTY].
11. Each individual volume bears its own title. Volume One, published in 1973, is ti-
tled "Rules and Order"; Volume Two, published in 1976, is titled 
" The Mirage of SocialJustice;
and Volume Three, published in 1979, is titled "The Political Order of a Free People."
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work. In fairness to Hayek, at times toward the end of his life, he
seemed aware of the potential scope of his modest concessions.1 2 But
during his most creative period, those state institutions that he spared
in his original attacks of socialism became the bulwark of the revision-
ist socialism of the next generation. The first portion of this lecture
therefore critically summarizes Hayek's basic intellectual orientation.
The second portion examines the critical connection between the so-
cialism of central planning and the more modern socialism (at least of
a sort) associated with the guarantee of minimum welfare rights.
I. HAYEK IN A NUTSHELL
Hayek shares one common feature with other great political phi-
losophers-their views of politics rest on their understanding of
human nature. Thus, for Aristotle, one begins with the general no-
tion of human sociability;1" for Hobbes, one begins with the general
notion of irreducible individual self-interest." For Hayek, the key as-
pect of the human condition is captured in one word-ignorance.
Over and over again, Hayek writes about the inability of rational
thought to cope with the constantly changing circumstances of
human societies here and everywhere, today and tomorrow. The only
thing that we know with some degree of certainty is our ignorance
about the shape of the social world and the future path of human and
natural events. He reminds us repeatedly of "the impossibility for any-
one of knowing all the particular facts on which the overall order of
the activities in a Great Society is based."15 By the "Great Society," he
meant one that was well-ordered in accordance with his theories, not
the massive government intervention championed by Lyndon John-
son. "Though not a single economy, the Great Society is still held
together mainly by what vulgarly are called economic relations."16
12. See Preface to the 1976 Reprint Edition of THE ROAD To SERFDOM, reprinted in F.A.
HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM at xxiv (fiftieth anniv. ed. 1994) [hereinafter HAYEK, 1976
Preface].
13. SeeARISTOTLE, POLITICS 9 (H. Rackham trans., Harvard Univ. Press 1972) (asserting
that "man is by nature a political animal").
14. See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 91 (Richard Tuck ed., Cambridge Univ. Press
1991) (1651) ("The Right of Nature .. . is the Liberty each man ha[s], to use his own
power, as he will himself[ ], for the preservation of his own Nature; that is to say, of his own
Life; and consequently, of doing any thing... he[ ] shall conceive to be the aptest means
thereunto.").
15. 2 F.A. -AYEK, LAw, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTv- THE MIRAGE OF SOCIAL JUSTICE 8
(1976) [hereinafter 2 HAYEK, LAw, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY].
16. Id. at 112. Hayek then explains what he means by these "vulgarly" relations: "What
are commonly called economic relations are indeed relations determined by the fact that
the use of all means is affected by the striving for those many different purposes. It is in
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More than anything else, Hayek's political philosophy is an effort to
ask what are the appropriate adaptive responses to this pervasive level
of systematic ignorance.
Hayek's faith in ignorance led to a profound anti-utilitarian
streak that one might not expect from a persistent critic of socialism.
To be sure, Hayek had no objection to the conventional accounts of
utility that asked whether some particular means was appropriate to a
given end. But the object of his scorn was the "constructivist fallacy of
utilitarianism."17 Accordingly, he was deeply skeptical of the philo-
sophical tradition that used "utility" as a marker for the desirable end
states of human action. In particular, he rejected any and all versions
of the Benthamite principle, in which the objective of the social order
is to maximize the greatest good for the greatest number, or perhaps
more dangerously, to maximize some impersonal entity known as
"utility" that hovers above, but is not part of, any particular individual
within society. 8 "The trouble with the whole utilitarian approach is
that, as a theory professing to account for a phenomenon which con-
sists of a body of rules, it completely eliminates the factor which makes
rules necessary, namely our ignorance."" Hayek thought that these
utilitarian programs were enormously dangerous because they sug-
gested that somebody inside the state, or inside society, had enough
knowledge about individual mental-states and satisfactions to make
the calculations of utility that this aggressive utilitarian program in
fact required. Thus, Hayek thought strong collectivist and socialist
components were built into utilitarian thought at the ground level.
For him, utilitarianism was not the philosophy of market liberalism; it
was a license for state intervention. z
What then was its antidote? For Hayek, salvation came from a
combination of two ideas-the creation of a spontaneous order and
the rule of law. By "spontaneous order," Hayek referred to the decen-
tralized processes in which countless interactions between ordinary in-
dividuals produced a set of results that were pleasing to each, but
which could not have been obtained by the command of any central-
this wide sense of the term 'economic' that the interdependence or coherence of the parts
of the Great Society is purely economic." Id.
17. Id. at 17.
18. See JEREMy BENTrHAM, A FRAGMENT ON GOVERNMENT 3 (James H. Bums & H.L.A.
Hart eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (1776) ("[I]t is the greatest happiness of the great-
est number that is the measure of right and wrong. . . ." (emphasis omitted)).
19. 2 HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY, supra note 15, at 20.
20. See id. at 19-23 (arguing that the fallacy of the Benthamite principle and the result-




ized political order.2 ' According to Hayek, it is the capacity for error
in particular cases that impels individuals within the spontaneous or-
der to gear their conduct by certain standard rules and practices, the
precise reasons for which they cannot fully understand.22 By the rule
of law, Hayek referred to those general principles for guiding human
behavior which allowed each individual to pursue his or her own ends
in accordance with their subjective preferences. 2' The rule of law was
the handmaiden of the spontaneous order, and for Hayek, the rules
of the spontaneous order develop much like the rules of grammar-
the people who follow the rules know how they work even if they do
not understand why they work.2 4
The obvious illustration of this spontaneous order for social rela-
tions is not a latent grammar, but the development of a market in any
standard commodity or good, where the terms and condition of trade,
including matters of quality, delivery and price, are set by no one in
particular, but for the benefit of all who are found in the group at
large. Indeed, it is clearly the competitive market process, as imper-
fect as it is, that allows for the diffusion of social information, much of
it embedded in prices, about first the cost of production, and then the
value of the goods and services they generate. Or, as Hayek was fond
of saying, "The advantages of competition do not depend on it being
'perfect.'" '25 Rather, they depend on the ability of the competitive
market process to reduce radical indeterminacy to acceptable levels
through thousands of decentralized, cooperative decisions.26
In taking this line, we can see, on this point at least, the close
affinity between Hayek and Hobbes. Hobbes is of course well known
for his view of the subjective value in contracts through his attack on
21. See 1 F.A. HAYEK, LAw, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY:. RULES AND ORDER 39 (1973)
[hereinafter 1 HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND ORDER] ("Most important.... is the relation
of a spontaneous order to the conception of purpose. Since such an order has not been
created by an outside agency, the order as such also can have no purpose[;] . . .its exist-
ence may be very serviceable to the individuals which move within such order.").
22. See id. at 43 ("Although man never existed without laws that he obeyed, he did, of
course, exist for hundreds of thousands of years without laws he 'knew' in the sense that he
was able to articulate them.").
23. See id. at 18 ("The problem of conducting himself successfully in a world only par-
tially known to man was thus solved by adhering to rules which had served him well. ").
24. See id. at 43 ("[R]ules in this sense exist and operate without being explicitly known
to those who obey them .... ."); STEVEN PINKER, THE LANGUAGE INSTINCT 18 (1994) (argu-
ing that language develops spontaneously and is employed by people instinctually "without
awareness of its underlying logic").
25. 3 HAYEK, LAw, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY, supra note 9, at 65.
26. See id. at 67-69 (describing competition as a discovery process wherein people gain
and communicate knowledge through acts of exchange).
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the medieval doctrine of the just price.27 The same theme comes
through in Hayek's account of our collective ignorance of subjective
values attached to individual ends. If I have a horse, and you have a
cow, I may prefer to have your cow and you may prefer to have my
horse. Thus, we can arrange an exchange that leaves both of us better
off. But if any outside observer looks at the physical world, he will still
see one cow and one horse. The only way that this observer could
conclude that the exchange has improved value by bettermatching
people with objects (or animals) in the external world is to accept the
self-knowledge that each person has of his own preference set.
I have just given the simplest case of barter. But if one attempts
to discover how to sort out thousands of different commodities and
services among thousands of individuals, Hayek's insight remains valid
today. An endless array of multiple, successive, and progressive ex-
changes does a better job than centralized planning in producing the
right goods and services, assigning them to the right individuals, and
encouraging innovation. Consider the ripple effects from the one
simple barter of horse for cow. If I can anticipate that my horse will
be more valuable to you, then instead of a single haphazard exchange,
I will go into the business of breeding horses for sale. In order to
operate this business, I will have to acquire the necessary "inputs." I
will hire other people to train the horses, buy grain to feed them, hire
somebody to build a barn to house them, and so forth. In each of
these transactions, I will deal with another individual who takes ex-
actly the same view of the world as I do. Each individual is quite will-
ing to exchange what he has for something that he values more. And
all will recognize that it is wiser to invest in the things that others want
than to rely on chance. So investment in human and physical capital
continues apace. The genius of the price and market system is that it
allows everyone to purchase someone else's outputs, without having to
try to figure out what his inputs are or how much they cost. I can
enjoy a concert without having to instruct the pianist on how to play
the piano or the crew on how to arrange the staging and the lighting.
Instead, I can rely on the warranties and promises of other individuals
to satisfy my wants. I do not need the knowledge of such things in
order to superintend this process. Hayek's basic insight is that prices
and markets facilitate selective communications among individuals
27. HOBBES, supra note 14, at 105 ("As if it were Injustice to sell dearer than we buy; or
to give more to a man than he merits. The value of all things contracted for, is measured




and thus overcome the fundamental barrier of ignorance, one trans-
action at a time.
Our ability to overcome ignorance is not static but dynamic, for
the same process operates with greater efficiency as other individuals
either enter into established networks of cooperative exchanges or
form their own. Because the system of voluntary exchange is not
bound to particular persons, places, or times, markets themselves al-
ways facilitate new entry. Someone will come in who, in the short run,
destabilizes the world for some other individual who thought he en-
joyed the position of a preferred supplier. But the creative energies of
the new entrant spur other individuals to rethink their own lives and
businesses, and thereafter to redeploy and redirect their own goods
and services. The system thus generates a virtuous circle, if only the
state does not treat the new entrant as a wrongdoer for disturbing the
established patterns of trade in the market. Indeed, his passionate
defense of free entry in The Road to Serfdom is one of Hayek's great
contributions to the creative energies of voluntary markets.28
The origins of this spontaneous order for Hayek do not rest in
the constructivist thought of utilitarian calculation. The metaphor, or
rather comparison, that Hayek evokes is obviously toward the untidy
but successful processes of biological evolution through natural selec-
tion. Indeed, the title of Chapter One of the first volume of Law,
Legislation and Liberty is "Reason and Evolution."29 Hayek picks his
words well. The former term is tied to a false Cartesian understanding
of the world, and the latter to a Darwinian perspective, which, accord-
ing to Hayek, Darwin had borrowed from the great social scientists,
starting with Bernard Mandeville and David Hume." We need not
trouble over the pattern of influence to recognize that Darwin's great
contribution was to show how a complex natural order could be ex-
plained by a single mechanism, that of natural selection-a process by
28. See HAYEK, THE ROAo TO SERFDOM, supra note 6, at 88-100 (emphasizing that "polit-
ical freedom is meaningless without economic freedom" and economic freedom can only
be sustained through competition and individual choice without government
intervention).
29. 1 HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY, supra note 21, at 8.
30. According to Hayek:
It was in the discussion of such social formations as language and morals, law and
money, that in the eighteenth century the twin conceptions of evolution and the
spontaneous formation of an order were at last clearly formulated, and provided
the intellectual tools which Darwin and his contemporaries were able to apply to
biological evolution. Those eighteenth-century moral philosophers and the his-





which nature takes an undifferentiated "soup" of organic chemicals,
which it then transforms through trial and error, success and failure,
into the incredibly rich kingdom of animals and plants. For Darwin, it
was never certain in theory which of several natural variations was the
fittest, and which would be extinguished; instead, the competition be-
tween species and between members of the same species meant that
their offspring would have differential rates of success. The distribu-
tion of survivors would not look like the distribution of their ances-
tors, and the movement between generations, when repeated
countless times, accounted for the diversity of animal and nature
life.31
Yet here again, the Darwinian point is not as conclusive as Hayek
might think. Darwin did not believe only in natural selection; he also
believed in artificial selection, and, as Jared Diamond reminds us, he
did not begin The Origin of Species with a discussion of natural selec-
tion, but instead with "a lengthy account of how our domesticated
plants and animals arose through artificial selection by humans." 2 It
was conscious domestication that brought us horses, cows, wheat, and
corn. And it was that ability that allowed individuals to forge the
larger social units and complex political institutions that were impossi-
ble in hunter-gatherer societies.
In thinking about the application of these Darwinian principles
to matters of political organization, Hayek did not sufficiently appreci-
ate the importance of either artificial selection or of the role that self-
interest played in the selection process and gave, perhaps, too much
weight to the indeterminacy of outcomes that natural selection of-
fered. Hayek found in natural selection a way to legitimate a decen-
tralized spontaneous order. He believed that individuals could
develop, by hook or by crook, the set of compatible social behaviors
that would allow them to thrive in common, even if they too did not
understand the reasons why their own practices turn out to be both
durable and successful. Ignorance again plays the central role. At
points, Hayek sounds almost mystical; the success of spontaneous or-
der made Hayek deeply suspicious of rational efforts to alter the pat-
terns of these social interactions. Those who sought utility directly
were not likely to find it. Those who ignored its lure were likely to
stumble upon it. In the end, Hayek was more opposed to the practice
of "constructing" utility than he was to the idea of utility itself.
31. See CHARLES DARWIN, THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES (Gillian Beer ed., Oxford Univ. Press
1996) (1859).




Hayek's uneasiness about the constructivist strand of utilitarian
thought has strong resonance even today. Within the modern law-
and-economics movement, the small-state types, like myself, tend to be
very suspicious of general and abstract principles such as the use of
the time-honored formulas for negligence in ordinary accident cases.
The formula starts with the view that every individual is under an obli-
gation to take reasonable care to avoid harming other individuals by
his own activities.33 But in fleshing out the standard of reasonable
care, we quickly turn to Learned Hand's generalized cost-benefit
formula that asks us to compare the burden of precautions with their
expected gains, or whether B><PL.34 That formula in turn both in-
vites and requires ajury or judge, or some combination of the two, to
make an exhaustive examination of the circumstances that led up to
the accident." The range of relevant factors confers a huge level of
discretion on any trier of fact, which has to count as the expansion of
state power that Hayek himself feared.
To avoid those difficulties, the small-government theorist will be
drawn to strict liability rules, in which the question of liability depends
on the outcome of individual choice, wholly without regard to
whether the conduct that led up to it was rational or not.36 The deci-
sions on rationality are thrown back on private decision makers, so
that state officials can make their decisions under general rules that
are devoid of overt and complicated utilitarian calculations.
33. See, e.g., Kerwhacker v. Cleveland, Columbus & Cincinnati R.R. Co., 3 Ohio St. 172,
176 (1854) (reciting the "maxim of the law, tested by the wisdom of centuries, exacts of
every person, in the enjoyment of his property, the duty of so using his own as not to injure
the property of his neighbor").
34. See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., Inc., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947). In
determining whether the absence of a bargee would make the owner of a barge liable for
injuries to other vessels that occurred after she broke away from her moorings, the court
held that the owner's duty to protect against injuries resulting from such an event was a
function of three variables:
(1) [t] he probability that she will break away; (2) the gravity of the resulting in-
jury, if she does; (3) the burden of adequate precautions. Possibly it serves to
bring this notion into relief to state it in algebraic terms: if the probability be
called P; the injury, L; and the burden, B; liability depends upon whether B is less
than L multiplied by P: i.e., whether B<PL.
Id.
35. See, e.g., id. at 173-74 (examining factors such as time of day, season, weather, and
location and condition of the harbor to determine the extent of the duty owed by the
absent bargee).
36. See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RULES FOR A COMPLEX WORLD 95 (1995) (using
strict liability to allow private decisions in accident prevention, so that "a person who makes




These strict liability rules work well for harms inflicted on stran-
gers, but not in consensual arrangements, where it is often in the in-
terests of individual plaintiffs to assume the risk of bad outcomes in
order to gain the benefits of possible favorable ones. But here too,
the good Hayekian should gravitate away from the use of cost-benefit
formulas to judge the reasonableness of conduct, after the fact, in
some particular case. Rather, where contract is not present as a guide,
the emphasis shifts to the question whether the conduct of a physician
or supplier of goods and services follows the customary standards of
practice of the trade or profession, or indeed of any respectable seg-
ment thereof. The legal system again shies away from explicit utilita-
rian calculations, which it is likely to get wrong.
In sum, Hayek overstated our ignorance of general social prac-
tices. But his point has special cogency in those situations in which we
call upon public institutions to make judgments about the rationality
of individual conduct in litigation contexts. One must shudder to
think of how Hayek would have responded to the modem law of sex-
ual harassment and the hopeless tangle that comes in distinguishing
welcome from unwelcome advances. To remain in the consequential-
ist tradition of the law-and-economics movements, we must embrace
the general rules of which Hayek spoke. The legal system must work,
as it were, through the rule of law, that is, through a series of general
rules which force cost-benefit calculations to be made, not by the
State, which is generally ignorant of what the individuals within it want
or desire, but rather by the individuals themselves. 7 The latter are
more knowledgeable of, and are better able to act upon, their own
preferences.
The key question is, however, how far we can push this basic in-
sight. Someone has to choose rules, and neither judges nor legislators
operate by the hit or miss techniques that characterize the spontane-
ous order. At some level we have to be confident enough of certain
general empirical regularities in order to decide which general rule
should be preferred to another. We would not want to adopt a rule of
law of broad application that said that individuals are never responsi-
ble in tort when they maim strangers or mistreat patients. We take
that position not because of our abiding sense of human ignorance,
but because of our fear of the systematic effects of unrestrained indi-
vidual self-interest. The party that keeps all the gains and bears none
of the losses is likely to engage in too many dangerous activities, no
37. See HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY, supra note 10, at 162-75 (explaining that
the conception of freedom under the law rests on obedience to abstract rules generated by
individuals as opposed to particular rules laid down by governments).
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matter what the refined differences in individual temperament or so-
cial situation. Thus, ignorance has to be woven into a more general
theory in order to choose among a list of potential general and ab-
stract rules.
Indeed, we can take the argument at least one step further. The
design of political institutions may well have to take into account diffi-
culties in predicting the political future, but it also has to take into
account some universal tendencies of human nature. Part of the price
that Hayek pays for his strong anti-utilitarian sentiment is that he can-
not be particularly enamored with efforts to form political society
through conscious acts of statesmanship by analogy, as it were, to
breeding and other forms of artificial selection. The ideal constitu-
tion within a Hayekian world would be the English Constitution with
its unclear origins, slow growth, and shadowy conventions. But he
should be suspicious of the quite deliberate architecture of the United
States Constitution, with its conscious reliance on the staples of polit-
ical theory-separation of powers, checks and balances, enumerated
powers, federalism, and entrenched rights.
Indeed, I think that it is useful to ponder the contrast between
Hayek's general views of decentralized power and The Federalist No.
1,3" where the question put by Hamilton is whether, when we form a
modern society, we want to do so by "reflection and choice," or
whether we shall remain forever subject to the vagaries of "accident
and force."39 Indeed, it is not far-fetched to see in the United States
Constitution a rejection of the idea that a sound government could
just evolve from the uncoordinated activities of well-intentioned indi-
viduals, or even thirteen somewhat fractious American states. Hayek
himself was somewhat torn by this counterexample, and in The Consti-
tution of Liberty hinted his ambivalence toward the matter when he in-
troduced his discussion of the United States Constitution by saying:
"Much is sometimes made of the fact that the American Constitution
is the product of design and that, for the first time in modern history,
a people deliberately constructed the kind of government under
which they wished to live."4 Yet, while he minimizes the impact of
38. THE FEDERALIST No. I (Alexander Hamilton).
39. Hamilton says it a lot better:
It has been frequently remarked that it seems to have been reserved to the people
of this country, by their conduct and example, to decide the important question,
whether societies of men are really capable or not of establishing good govern-
ment from reflection and choice, or whether they are forever destined to depend
for their political constitutions on accident and force.
Id. at 1 (Roy Fairfield ed., 2d ed. 1981).
40. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY, supra note 10, at 183.
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design, he finds himself in basic sympathy with all the major compo-
nents of the American system set out above.
What was needed from Hayek, however, was some tempering of
his basic hostility toward planned organizations. The theory of volun-
tary interactions may well explain the emergence of spot markets for
the purchase and sale of given goods. However, it works far less well
in explaining the emergence of a wide range of intermediate institu-
tions from stock exchanges to trade associations, to condominium as-
sociations-institutions which often rely on specific articles of
incorporation that specify in some detail the rights and duties of their
members, and which take care to outline both the governance proce-
dures and the dispute resolution mechanisms among individuals.4 1
The conscious creation of these institutions is not necessarily a good
or a bad thing. Rather, the decision to put all transactions of a similar
type into one basket leads to a high stakes game. Those organizations
that put together poor constitutions will have to reform or perish. But
those who come up with sound designs will outperform those groups
that do not attend to the question of governance at all. And so it is
that we see how some voluntary organizations flourish while others
languish or die. The reason why we spend so much time on constitu-
tional issues is that we get only one shot at the right organization,
because the monopoly of state power cannot afford the luxury of trial
and error that might be tolerated with a large number of private orga-
nizations. Hayek is not successful in papering over the tensions be-
tween the success of American constitutionalism and his own
predilections for the rise of spontaneous order. He would have done
better by praising the founders of the American Constitution for their
practical wisdom, and recognizing the limits as well as the uses of the
principles of spontaneous order.
Hayek's affection for the principle of spontaneous order was not,
of course, directed against the United States Constitution. It was di-
rected toward the expansion of state power under socialism. His main
target was central planning, a term which today has a largely archaic
sound, in no small measure to Hayek's attacks on the practice. But
41. See Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the
Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115, 115 (1992) ("The diamond industry has systemati-
cally rejected state-created law. In its place, the sophisticated traders who dominate the
industry have developed an elaborate, internal set of rules, complete with distinctive insti-
tutions and sanctions, to handle disputes among industry members."); see also AW. Brian
Simpson, Contracts for Cotton to Arrive: The Case of the Two Ships Peerless, 11 CARozo L. REV.
287, 304 (1989) (explaining that the Cotton Brokers' Association "provided a system for
arbitrating the disputes which arose from time to time between the [cotton] brokers and
set standard contract forms and associated trading rules" (footnote omitted)).
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writing about this subject today requires us to jolt our memories and
recall just how pervasive and controversial the issue of central plan-
ning was both in Great Britain and the United States between the two
World Wars. The Great Depression had taken its toll on the confi-
dence that Western democracies had placed in markets and small gov-
ernments. Everywhere the corporatist state was thought to be the
source of economic security and the remedy for unemployment, eco-
nomic dislocation and general privation. The segmentation of finan-
cial institutions in the United States was a creature of the depression,
as were agricultural cartels and collective bargaining in employment.
Central planning was not confined to the United States and Great
Britain, but was raised to a destructive art by the totalitarian nations
under Communist, Fascist, and Nazi rule. Hayek, as an Austrian, was
keenly aware of the consequences of the annexation of Austria into
Germany in 1938, and one of the themes in The Road to Serfdom was his
gloomy warning that the central planning of Great Britain could in-
sensibly lead to the rise of totalitarian regimes and the necessary de-
cline of cherished political liberties and democratic institutions.42 But
in this respect at least, Hayek seems to have overstated his case. It may
well be that Western democracies do not accord any preferred or en-
trenched status to the market and think that many forms of economic
regulation that Hayek loathes pass constitutional muster. However,
they do draw the line at government action which suppresses political
dissent or confiscates private property. People are not sent to the gas
chambers for demanding free elections, thereby sparing the demo-
cratic West the horrors of its totalitarian neighbors.
The constitutional safeguards of Great Britain and the United
States operate in very different ways. In neither country are they suffi-
cient to drive us to the social optimum, and they surely leave the gate
42. Hayek stated:
Now, it is somewhat difficult to think of Germany and Italy, or of Russia, not as
different worlds but as products of a development of thought in which we have
shared; it is, at least so far as our enemies are concerned, easier and more com-
fortable to think that they are entirely different from us and that what happened
there cannot happen here. Yet the history of these countries in the years before
the rise of the totalitarian system showed few features with which we are not
familiar.
HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM, supra note 6, at 11.
Hayek never quite parted from this theme, noting, for example, that defenders of the
administrative state could so twist the conception of the rule of law to affirm the proposi-
tion that "if Hider had obtained power in a constitutional manner, the rule of law would
still have prevailed in Nazi Germany." HAYEK, THE CONsTITUTION OF LIBERTY, supra note
10, at 243 (citing FINER, supra note 8, at 60).
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open for faction and intrigue.4" But by the same token, it is critical to
recognize as well that the protections that have survived have com-
manded sufficiently wide public support to help ward off the cata-
strophic consequences of totalitarian regimes.44
A proper evaluation of Hayek's critique of central planning
should be divorced from his critique of totalitarian regimes. But even
taken in isolation, Hayek still deplored government central planning.
In his view, no group of individuals has the knowledge and skills to
coordinate the activities of millions of separate individuals, all of
whom have their own distinctive ends and conceptions of the good.
The state should therefore confine its attentions to fostering those
institutions that make these private expressions of self-worth possible,
which once again brings us safely back to the rule of law and the emer-
gence of market institutions. No experts could generate the full
range of needed socialist calculations. Even when the totalitarian ele-
ments were removed, Hayek remained deeply suspicious of the ad-
ministrative state whose particularistic commands he saw as the
antithesis of the rule of law.45
But Hayek was no naive visionary. He certainly did not believe
that markets could operate of their own volition without any kind of
support from the state. It is at this juncture that the rule of law be-
comes critical to offer a secure framework for these voluntary transac-
tions to take place. The rule of law supplied the universal forms of
engagement in which particular desires could be satisfied. However,
it is at this point that the reader, or at least this reader, finds his ab-
stractions elusive and unsatisfying. However insistent Hayek is on the
centrality of the rule of law, he does not reveal the precise content of
the "rules ofjust conduct"4 6 or explain why their universal application
is sufficient protection against favoritism and intrigue. We can freely
43. Nothing that I say here should be construed as a recantation of my outspoken views
on the proper interpretation of the Takings Clause. RicHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE
PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 331 (1985) ("My thesis is that the eminent
domain approach, as applied both to personal liberty and private property, offers a princi-
pled account of both the functions of the state and the limitations upon its powers.").
44. See Richard A. Epstein, Imitations of Libertarian Thought, Soc. PHIL. & POL., Summer
1998, at 412, 423 (arguing that security, as "the indisputable core of any conception of
personal autonomy," provides a strong barrier to totalitarian movements).
45. See HAYv, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY, supra note 10, at 260 (observing that the
expansion of the welfare state, which followed the decline of the rule of law, could not
occur without depriving individuals of choice in matters that the state deemed it necessary
to correct and control).
46. See 2 HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY, supra note 15, at 34-42 (describing the
rules of just conduct by their function to limit the range of possible actions available to
individuals under various circumstances).
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concede that the elimination of extraordinary procedures and secre-
tive deliberations commonly associated with Star Chamber tends in
the right direction. However, at points Hayek makes a near mystical
appeal to the abstract values contained in the rule of law. But is it
more homily or analysis? What he needed to do was to look beyond
the rule of law as a set of formal considerations and to explain which
rules of universal application are in fact just. He should treat, as I
have suggested elsewhere, the rule of law as a necessary, but not a
sufficient, condition for a sound political order.47 My colleague Cass
Sunstein has written: "Hayek thinks that the rule of law forbids 'arbi-
trary' distinctions. But any judgment that distinctions are 'arbitrary'
stems not from the notion of the rule of law, but from an independent
set of arguments, specifying the appropriate grounds for distinguish-
ing among people and groups."4" I have no doubt that Hayek sup-
ported traditional conceptions of individual autonomy, private
property, and freedom of contract, but he showed none of the depth
of feeling toward these conceptions that he showed toward the rule of
law.
Indeed, one of Hayek's weaknesses is his relative indifference to
the creation of social infrastructure that thoughtful proponents of
laissez-faire have long recognized as necessary to secure the institu-
tions of voluntary exchange.49 It is not sufficient simply to have rules
that enforce contracts and prevent the rule of force. It is also neces-
47. As I have previously argued:
[I]f the rule of law... is necessary for ajust and sound society, it is a very differ-
ent question to ask whether it is sufficient to achieve that result. In one sense it
would be desirable that the answer were yes, for then it would be possible to make
judgments about sound social arrangements solely by noting some easily observa-
ble marks of formal laws. Nonetheless I think that... Hayek [was] too optimistic
in thinking that the rule of law in and of itself offered sufficient protection for the
just social order. Some rule of law is better than no rule of law. But the choice of
the best, even the best achievable, form of political organization demands more
than faithful adherence to the rule of law can provide.
Richard A. Epstein, Beyond the Rule of Law: Civic Virtue and Constitutional Structure, 56 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 149, 152 (1987).
48. Cass R. Sunstein, The Road from Serfdom, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Oct. 20, 1997, at 36, 42
(reviewing 10 THE COLLECrED WORKS OF F.A. HAYEK: SOCIALISM AND WAR (Bruce Caldwell
ed., 1997)).
49. As one commentator noted:
[T]he pioneer systematic exponents of [laissez faire], the Physiocrats and Adam
Smith, argued for.., the limitation of governmental activity to the enforcement
of peace and of "justice" in the restricted sense of "commutative justice," to de-
fense against foreign enemies, and to public works regarded as essential and as
impossible or highly improbable of establishment by private enterprise or, for
special reasons, unsuitable to be left to private operation.
Jacob Viner, The Intellectual History of Laissez Faire, 3 J.L. & ECON. 45, 45 (1960).
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sary to have common institutions and common property to make the
system work. Indeed, a modern society needs to have at least some
measure of public planning. On that matter, it is one thing to quote
Hayek's wonderful passage:
The distinction . . .between formal law or justice and
substantive rules is very important and at the same time most
difficult to draw precisely in practice. Yet the general princi-
ple involved is simple enough. The difference between the
two kinds of rules is the same as that between laying down a
Rule of the Road, as in the Highway Code, and ordering peo-
ple where to go; or, better still, between providing signposts
and commanding people which road to take.5"
But Hayek's statement cannot be allowed to conceal the fact that
it is the function of the state to determine whether these highways will
run through town or around it, how many lanes they will have, and
where the on and off ramps will be located. Those matters require at
least some knowledge of how public institutions can support private
development. In The Constitution of Liberty, Hayek makes some conces-
sions to this need for infrastructure. He recognizes the need to take
into account the "neighborhood effects" that the activities of one
landowner will have on another, 1 and that, in light of these effects,
"[t] he general formulas of private property or freedom of contract do
not ... provide an immediate answer to the complex problems which
city life raises."5 2 But he is far more effective in his denunciation of
rent control rules53 than he is in the articulation of an intelligent rule
that explains what form of land use planning is acceptable by govern-
ment and what forms amount to impermissible social control. Over
and over again his basic inclination is to try to reduce the messy busi-
ness of land planning to a specific application of the general rule of
law:
50. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM, supra note 6, at 74.
51. See HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY, supra note 10, at 341.
52. Id.
53. In The Constitution of Liberty, Hayek asserts:
Because of rent restriction, large sections of the population in Western countries
have become subject to arbitrary decisions of authority in their daily affairs and
accustomed to looking for permission and direction in the main decisions of
their lives. They have come to regard it as a matter of course that the capital
which pays for the roof over their heads should be provided free by somebody
else and that individual economic well-being should depend on the favor of the





Such "town planning" [of the good sort], which operates
largely through its effects on the market and through the
establishing of general conditions to which all developments
of a district or neighborhood must conform but which,
within these conditions, leaves the decisions to the individual
owner, is part of the effort to make the market mechanism
more effective. 54
His bromides offer little of value to anyone who must sort out differ-
ent land use proposals, or pass on the constitutionality of various gov-
ernment land use restrictions.
The problem here is deeper than Hayek would like to admit.
Once we recognize that coherence is necessary for planning infra-
structure, it becomes far more difficult to start from the assumption
that the land planner is radically ignorant of what individuals want. At
the very least, we have to decide that it is better to build our four-lane
highways between the population centers of Washington and Balti-
more than between two isolated farms. To be sure, this simple-
minded choice requires little reflection, but the location of highways
is far more contentious as we make detailed plans for the system that
requires us to decide whether to widen Fourth or Fifth Street. The
task admits no perfection, but the mere fact that it is undertaken re-
quires us to acknowledge that perhaps we can find more regularity inhuman preferences and human conduct than Hayek was willing to
accept. It is not necessary for us to deny the important component of
subjectivity in human preferences. But it is necessary to recognize
some greater capability to learn of these preferences than Hayek isprepared to acknowledge. In an odd sense, therefore, Hayek pushes
too hard on our collective ignorance to the extent that it denies us the
ability to make intelligent collective judgments on the location, con-
struction, and funding of social infrastructure. Thus far it looks like
Hayek's opposition to socialism leaves him unable to account for the
state provision of classical public goods.
II. SOCIALISM AND MINIMUM RIGHTS
It is quite clear that Hayek's appeal to our collective ignorance
explains the dominance of free markets, but it also leaves him unable
to develop a sound theory of when collective action is required andhow it should be conducted. The notion of collective goods presents
an endless challenge to political thinkers of all persuasions. What is
quite fascinating about Hayek is that he does not limit the state role to
54. Id. at 350.
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the provision of these public goods, but moves beyond this point.
Upon re-reading The Road to Serfdom, one notices that the topic of
Chapter 9 is "Security and Freedom."5 I wish to focus on the former,
because security is one of the great terms of Western Civilization, yet
one whose meaning and nuances do not, generally speaking, receive
sufficient attention-including from Hayek himself.56 By contrast,
the social contract tradition of English law, beginning with Hobbes,
and including Hume and Locke, sets forth a very clear and coherent
account of security; this account drives most of what these philoso-
phers believe. They begin, of course, with an original position which
they were happy to call, as we are not, "the state of nature." In the
state of nature, there are no public or collective restraints upon the
action of any individual." Hobbes thought that in this condition nat-
ural liberty allowed individuals to do whatever they could until re-
strained by a greater force.58 Although in the state of nature we can
describe acts in physical terms, such as "tending my garden" or "blow-
ing your brains out," we cannot say that either of them is right or
wrong until some greater power decrees that action to be a wrong.
Others, most notably Locke, have disagreed with Hobbes as to
whether there could be a system of right and wrong in a state of na-
ture.5 9 But where people start is in a sense less important than where
they end. The entire social contract tradition identifies the manifest
of inconvenience with individual excesses in the state of nature. The
great question of political theory is how each of us trades in some of
our untrammeled liberty of action for security against various kinds of
activities undertaken by other individuals.
The fundamental issue of political theory is how to orchestrate
this surrender of liberty for security. First, we attempt to use contrac-
55. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM, supra note 6, at 119.
56. For my more detailed account, see Epstein, supra note 44, at 420 ("What is striking
about the Hayekian position is that neither form of security under discussion [in chapter 9
of The Road to Serfdom] refers to the protection that the state supplies against external
aggression, independent of the wealth of its citizens.").
57. See HOBBES, supra note 14, at 91 ("The Right of Nature ... is the Liberty each man
ha[s], to use his own power, as he will himself[ ], for the preservation of his own Nature;
that is to say, of his own Life; and consequently, of doing any thing... he[] shall conceive
to be the aptest means thereunto.").
58. See id. ("Liberty, is understood .. . [as] the absence of external[] Impediments:
which Impediments may of[ten] take away part of a mans power to do what he[ ] would
59. SeeJoHN LocKE, Two TREATisEs OF GOVERNMENT 289 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge
Univ. Press 2d ed. 1970) (1698) ("The State of Nature has a Law of Nature to govern it,
which obliges every one: And Reason, which is that Law, teaches all Mankind, who will but
consult it, that being all equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in his Life,
Health, Liberty, or Possessions.").
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tual terms, yet quickly realize their inadequacy because there are too
many parties, with too diffused interests, with too great a geographical
dispersion for one contract to bind all individuals. Even if everyone
alive or in a given region could agree at one point in time, the mo-
ment new people are born, or strangers immigrate into the commu-
nity at large, the old contract will have to be renegotiated or
abandoned. Thus, the usual tools of offer and acceptance, and actual
consent, do not suffice to form the social order. To use Ronald
Coase's influential and modern formulation of the problem, the trans-
action costs are so high to preclude a voluntary agreement from which
everyone could gain.6 ° But at the most visceral level, unanimity is es-
sential lest the one individual not bound by the social contract subju-
gate or kill all the others.
To escape this untimely outcome, social contract theory looks to
individuals' objectives in forming ordinary contracts. And we (and
here it is the collective "we") conclude that each individual wishes to
surrender something he values (natural liberty) in order to gain some-
thing of greater value (political security). Hayek's faith of radical ig-
norance notwithstanding, we are reasonably confident that in this
stark example we know what individuals value and fear, and that we
can decide what institutional arrangements serve, or frustrate, those
interests. Thus, we are also confident that almost all individuals-ex-
cept for a few pathological cases-prefer the right to live to the right
to kill another individual. Under its classical liberal formulation, the
great social contract sacrifices liberty, but only to the extent that it is
necessary to gain security against force and fraud. Perhaps we might
go further, but surely we go this far.
Rightly organized, this social contract overcomes the difficulties
of actual agreements. The present generation can adopt this institu-
tion by political measures, and command the allegiance of all individ-
uals by showing them how they benefit on net from the arrangements
to which they are forced to subscribe. Future generations and new
immigrants are allowed to enter the society on the same terms that
bind everyone else. Because what is required is universal forbearance
from the use of force and fraud, the substantive content of the obliga-
tion does not shift with each arrival or departure. Population shifts do
not require us to redefine the basic obligations or take special steps to
inform newcomers what is required of them. Combined with systems
of taxation and regulation that allow the formation of infrastructure,
60. R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3J.L. & ECON. 1, 42-44 (1960).
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we have a system that falls short of perfection, but nonetheless oper-
ates with some level of overall efficiency.
How, if at all, should this classical account of the relationship be-
tween liberty and security be updated for the modern age? Hayek's
response is quite surprising in light of the general tenor of his
thought. Far from being skeptical, cautious, or wary of new-fangled
ideas, Hayek swallows them too easily. He spends little time discussing
security against aggression, although he clearly endorses it. Rather,
he puts that to one side, only to distinguish between two other con-
ceptions of security. The first is security against privation and suffer-
ing; the second is security that insulates one's general economic
position from the economic forces of change:
These two kinds of security are, first, security against severe
physical privation, the certainty of a given minimum of suste-
nance for all; and, second, the security of a given standard of
life, or of the relative position which one person or group
enjoys compared with others; or, as we may put it briefly, the
security of a minimum income and the security of the partic-
ular income a person is thought to deserve....
There is no reason why in a society which has reached
the general level of wealth which ours has attained the first
kind of security should not be guaranteed to all without en-
dangering general freedom .... [T]here can be no doubt
that some minimum of food, shelter, and clothing, sufficient
to preserve health and the capacity to work, can be assured
to everybody. Indeed, for a considerable part of the popula-
tion of England this sort of security has long been achieved.
Nor is there any reason why the state should not assist
the individuals in providing for those common hazards of
life against which, because of their uncertainty, few individu-
als can make adequate provision. Where, as in the case of
sickness and accident, neither the desire to avoid such calam-
ities nor the efforts to overcome their consequences are as a
rule weakened by the provision of assistance-where, in
short, we deal with genuinely insurable risks-the case for
the state's helping to organize a comprehensive system of so-
cial insurance is very strong .... To the same category be-
longs also the increase of security through the state's
rendering assistance to the victims of such "acts of God" as
earthquakes and floods. Wherever communal action can
mitigate disasters against which the individual can neither at-
tempt to guard himself nor make provision for the conse-
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quences, such communal action should undoubtedly be
taken.6 t
This distinction was stated with equal clarity over thirty years later
in Volume 2 of Law, Legislation and Liberty:
There is no reason why in a free society government
should not assure to all protection against severe deprivation
in the form of an assured minimum income, or a floor below
which nobody need to descend. To enter into such an insur-
ance against extreme misfortune may well be in the interest
of all; or it may be felt to be a clear moral duty of all to assist,
within the organized community, those who cannot help
themselves. So long as such a uniform minimum income is
provided outside the market to all those who, for any reason,
are unable to earn in the market an adequate maintenance,
this need not lead to a restriction of freedom, or conflict
with the Rule of Law. The problems with which we are here
concerned arise only when the remuneration for services
rendered is determined by authority, and the impersonal
mechanism of the market which guides the direction of indi-
vidual efforts is thus suspended.6 2
Yet he thinks (quite rightly) that the other form of security is
counterproductive in the extreme. In one memorable passage, he
succinctly states the difficulty:
[T]he policies which are now followed everywhere, which
hand out the privilege of security, now to this group and now
to that, are nevertheless rapidly creating conditions in which
the striving for security tends to become stronger than the
love of freedom. The reason for this is that with every grant
of complete security to one group the insecurity of the rest
necessarily increases. If you guarantee to some a fixed part
of a variable cake, the share left to the rest is bound to fluctu-
ate proportionally more than the size of the whole. And the
essential element of security which the competitive system of-
fers, the great variety of opportunities, is more and more
reduced.63
61. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM, supra note 6, at 120-21.
62. 2 HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY, supra note 15, at 87.
63. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM, supra note 6, at 128. For a similar recognition of
the risks of political guarantees, see David Schmidtz, Guarantees, Soc. PHIL. & POL., Sum-
mer 1997, at 1, 3:
[A] society is trying too hard when, to avoid the prospect of leaving individuals to
"sink or swim," it issues guarantees that not only collectivize responsibility but
externalize it at the same time. Such guarantees do not merely help decision
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His great argument is of course that the illusion of this second
form of security is counterproductive. Giving some individuals a pro-
tected position does not reduce the amount of natural uncertainty in
the world; indeed, it increases the amount of uncertainty-natural
and political-that all individuals have to bear. But so long as some
individuals claim exemption from these external forces other individ-
uals will have to bear their additional cost for no additional compensa-
tion. It follows, therefore, that it is a hopeless task for the state to
confer on each individual the "right" to some particularjob and to the
maintenance of the historical income that it has generated. Hayek
notes that many workers have entered into trades that have long
yielded them a certain income. When new technology becomes avail-
able, however, a new generation no longer needs blacksmiths or typ-
ists or chiropractors or abdominal surgeons or law professors to the
same degree as before.64 Such individuals find that diminished de-
mand leads to lower income.
In The Road to Serfdom, Hayek thus denounces that form of secur-
ity that allows individuals who invest human capital to enjoy their peak
earnings throughout life. He is surely at his best when insisting that a
policy of guaranteed income within established professions and trades
ruins the competitive market. Once certain services become un-
needed, then some form of state subsidy will be required in order to
maintain at the same level the incomes of those who have provided
these services. In turn, this subsidy will require heavy taxes on other
individuals, including those innovators who promise greater advances
to society than individuals whose services are subsidized. The mere
possibility that interest groups could obtain such relief poses the ad-
ded danger of leading them to take up the cause of resistance, rather
than weaning themselves from their dependence on traditional occu-
pations. At root, this new form of security operates at cross-purposes
with the classical conceptions of security, which are linked to the pro-
tection of private property and voluntary exchange against the perils
of force and fraud. Strong property and contract allow individuals to
plan for the future and to pool risks through contracts of insurance.
makers spread costs among themselves but also help them pass costs on to third
parties without consent.
Id.
64. See HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM, supra note 6, at 122-23 ("We all know the tragic
plight of the highly trained man whose hard-learned skill has suddenly lost its value be-
cause of some invention which greatly benefits the rest of society. The history of the last
hundred years is full of instances of this kind . . ").
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In the short term, Hayek wrote in vain. The conservative govern-
ment of Winston Churchill was whisked out of office in the general
elections held at the conclusion of the war. Then followed a period of
increased socialization of the means of production over the thirty-five
years until Margaret Thatcher became Prime Minister of Great Britain
in 1979. Thatcher took on coal miners who had demanded exactly
the sort of security that Hayek had deplored; the coal miners insisted
on their right to mine coal so long as a single lump was left in the
ground, no matter how high the cost of extraction or how low its mar-
ket value.65 The trade unionists saw changes in the conditions of sup-
ply, demand, and profit as utterly irrelevant to their position; other
citizens thus had to pay for this particular extravagance. 66 The stagna-
tion in England in real income in the post-war period showed that
Hayek was right to reject these partial claims for security as destructive
of the security of the whole. It is a lesson that we should not forget
today when the Al Gores of the left and the Patrick Buchanans of the
right offer their own brands of protectionism with the same deleteri-
ous consequences. 67
I have no doubt that Hayek rightly foresaw that this provincial
form ofjob protection constitutes the greatest threat to the vitality of a
free society. It hardly follows, however, that Hayek should have con-
ceded (let alone claimed) that the state did have an obligation to pro-
vide that form of security that protected individuals from various
forms of privation-minimum incomes, health insurance, and flood
and earthquake insurance.6" Accordingly, in The Road to Serfdom,
Hayek lists an impressive array of services that he was willing to let the
state provide.69 Also, when general employment levels fluctuate due
to public policy decisions, Hayek seemed willing to entertain-
although not as clearly so as in the other cases-some system of unem-
ployment insurance for the purpose of tiding people over the rough
65. See Maureen Johnson, Thatcher Says She Will Not Compromise with Union, ASSOCIATED
PRESS, Feb. 1, 1985, available in 1985 WL 2850675 ("Mrs. Thatcher... said it was unaccept-
able for the miners to deny management the right to close unprofitable mines.").
66. See 3 HAVEK, LAW, LEGISIATION AND LIBERTY, supra note 9, at 144 ("By conferring...
on the trade unions unique privileges, which hardly government itself enjoys, organiza-
tions of workers have been enabled to exploit other workers by altogether depriving them
of the opportunity of good employment.").
67. For a spirited exposh, see VIRGINIA POSTREL, THE FUTURE AND ITS ENEMIES (1998).
68. For a recent account of the hurricane related dangers of subsidizing coastal con-
struction, see Sebastian Junger, The Coast Isn't Clear, WALL ST. J., Oct. 9, 1998, at A12,
available in 1998 WL 1897447.
69. See text accompanying supra note 61.
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times.7" Although somewhat uneasy about the point, Hayek was pre-
pared to say that, as long as we allow free entry and exit into busi-
nesses, and allow wages and prices to move, then health and safety
regulations could be consistent with the effective operation of com-
petitive markets.7 '
As I noted earlier, Hayek had second thoughts about this point,
for some thirty years later he wrote:
At the time I wrote, socialism meant unambiguously the
nationalization of the means of production and the central
economic planning which this made possible and necessary.
In this sense Sweden, for instance, is today very much less
socialistically organized than Great Britain or Austria,
though Sweden is commonly regarded as much more social-
istic. This is due to the fact that socialism has come to mean
chiefly the extensive redistribution of incomes through taxa-
tion and the institutions of the welfare state.72
In his review of Hayek's collected works, Cass Sunstein derides
Hayek's asserted connection between state control over the means of
production and the redistribution of wealth in society: "[t]his, cer-
tainly, is a far less plausible claim. Nothing in his arguments in this
book establishes it."73 But with a little work, we can forge that connec-
tion, both in formal and pragmatic terms, even more closely than
Hayek understood. Start with Hayek's concurrence in the conven-
tional wisdom that socialism means the collective ownership of the
means of production. In the classic planned economy, the state either
ran the business itself, set the terms and conditions under which pri-
vate parties could sell their wares, or established the wages at which
they were forced to pay their employees. That distinction is only one
of a matter of degree (although important for that reason). Having
the state set these prices and wages is to give it a partial ownership
70. See HAYEK, THE RoAD TO SERFDOM, supra note 6, at 121 ("[T]hough [the] solution
[to unemployment] will require much planning in the good sense, it does not-or at least
need not-require that special kind of planning which according to its advocates is to
replace the market.").
71. See id. at 132 ("There can be no question that adequate security against severe
privation ... will have to be one of the main goals of policy. But if those endeavors are to
be successful and are not to destroy individual freedom, security must be provided outside
the market and competition be left to function unobstructed.").
72. HAYEK, 1976 Preface, supra note 12, at xxiii. The same point was made more force-
fully by Milton Friedman in his 1971 introduction to the German translation, which he
quoted extensively in his special introduction written in 1994 to the 50th anniversary edi-
tion of the book. See Milton Friedman, Introduction to F.A. HAYEK, THE RoAD TO SERFDOM at
xiii (fiftieth anniv. ed. 1994).
73. Sunstein, supra note 48, at 40.
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position by depriving the owner of some of the standard incidents of
ownership. That elimination might be justified in the regulation of
monopoly institutions such as common carriers and public utilities, as
an effort to edge closer to a competitive economy. But when the regu-
lation is imposed, regardless of market structure and in competitive
markets, thatjustification fails, so the assertion of state power amounts
to a partial state ownership of the means of production, a limited
form of socialism.
To be sure, this form of state regulation differs from traditional
socialism in that the state takes a chunk of every business and for-
swears direct ownership of its large industrial firms. The comparison
brings to mind the relationship between collective bargaining laws
and antidiscrimination laws. The former impact (most heavily) un-
ionized firms. The latter cut a broader swathe, but exert a smaller
effect on every firm, unionized or not. No a priori argument estab-
lishes which form of regulation interferes most with the operation of a
competitive labor market. The precise incidence of state restrictions
has to be examined to determine the magnitude of specific state inter-
ventions; there are no short cuts.
A couple of examples should help illustrate the potential magni-
tude of the problem. Let the state supply insurance against floods
and earthquakes, and the private market for those goods will be
crowded out, often with catastrophic effects."4 Hayek writes as though
these markets are free of moral hazard when he describes these losses
as "disasters against which the individual can neither attempt to guard
himself nor make provision for the consequences."75 But once the
state decides to provide insurance at below market rates (or worse,
bail people out without requiring any insurance from them at all), it
provokes just this threat to sound resource allocation. Moral hazard
and adverse selection are alive and well in these markets. Individuals
will build their homes in areas that are exposed to high risks of floods
and earthquakes-right in the heart of hurricane territory if neces-
sary.76 And because governments will resist paying for these subsidies
directly, they will find ways to burden private insurance companies
with the systematic losses associated with assigned risk pools. One
common strategy is to forbid companies to exit markets in which the
74. See Richard A. Epstein, Catastrophic Responses to Catastrophic Risks, 12J. RiSK & UN-
CERTAINTY 287, 293-94 (1996).
75. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM, supra note 6, at 121.
76. SeeJunger, supra note 68.
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premiums are set too low, as Florida did after Hurricane Andrew.7 7
But these coercive measures in turn undermine otherwise viable vol-
untary markets, producing the very dislocations that Hayek so heartily
disapproved.
The same point can be made of the system of social security, in-
troduced in 1935, nearly a decade before Hayek wrote The Road to
Serfdom. These programs have the exact same effect on "security" that
Hayek feared. Social security works wonders for the income of those
who joined the program earlier, and whose income today is guaran-
teed against major fluctuations. But the correlative taxes needed to
fund the program place at ever greater risk the next generation of
individuals who are asked to keep the program in clover. No system
of general redistribution can make all individuals more secure simul-
taneously, and the high level of intergenerational wealth transfers has
many of the same consequences of the job protection and security
programs that rightly earned Hayek's wrath.
Sixty years later, the new battleground for security was the ill-
fated Health Security Act of 1993.78 One reason why that program
failed was that it could not generate increased security to all individu-
als simultaneously, even though it could impoverish them all simulta-
neously. Politically, the group most opposed to the passage of the Act
turned out to be senior citizens on Medicare who recognized that
their preferred position was threatened by any effort to extend guar-
antees to all citizens.
A more limited intervention can also have profound effects. We
can have entry and exit of firms into labor markets, but so long as all
workers are entitled to receive Medicare protection at age sixty-five,
competition over one important component of retirement benefits is
effectively curtailed by the state monopoly in critical contract terms.
And the same pattern of intergenerational transfers is an outgrowth of
the recent amendments to the age discrimination laws that eliminate
mandatory retirement for (amongst others) university professors.
77. Florida's law featured two central provisions. See 1993 Fla. Laws ch. 93-401 (impos-
ing moratorium on cancellation and non-renewal of residential property insurance policies
on the basis of risk of hurricane claims); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 215.555 (West Supp. 1998)
(calling for mandatory participation on the part of the state in the Hurricane Catastrophe
Fund by providing reimbursements to insurers).
78. For a detailed discussion, see RIcHARD A. EPSTEIN, MORTAL PERIL: OUR INALIENABLE
RIGHT TO HEALTH CARE? 215 (1997) (concluding that the demise of Clinton's Health Se-
curity Act was well deserved because "[i]t could have done little to improve the lot of the
uninsured, but it would have done much more to reduce care and increase the cost of care
for the rest of the population"). For a far more sympathetic account, see THEDA SKOCPOL,




Here again, the additional security that is conferred on senior employ-
ees comes out of the hide of younger generations. In academic terms,
senior faculty get to keep their positions, their pensions, and their
salaries, while younger faculty members scramble to fill folding chairs
which, as their name suggests, offer no job security at all. Even as late
as 1976, Hayek had little sense of the extent to which these state pro-
grams could grow under the shadow of state protection, or of the im-
plicit tax they impose on economic growth.
This quick review shows why it is improper to conclude that aban-
doning central planning renders benign other forms of state regula-
tion. Indeed, to some extent, the rejection of state planning-which
is hardly the same thing as a rejection of land planning 79 -over large
sectors of the economy has intensified the pressure on legislative bod-
ies to adopt various forms of general regulation of health and safety.
Sometimes, perhaps often, regulation that addresses these concerns
serves public-regarding ends. But even when the motivation seems
sound, why should the government think it appropriate to force peo-
ple to adopt particular safety rules that they are always free to adopt
voluntarily? The impetus for state regulation often comes down to the
danger to which Hayek was always alert-blocking entry. One perva-
sive theme of modem regulatory and constitutional work highlights
the disparate impact of formally neutral rules. Let the same restric-
tion apply to a large plant and a small one, and the cost of compli-
ance-or, more accurately, the cost of compliance per unit of good-
could easily differ. The effect, therefore, is to place a heavier tax on
the one business than on its rival, which in turn retards entry or spurs
exit, thereby increasing industrial concentration. Hayekian fears
about central planning do not disappear simply because the next gen-
eration of regulation adopts novel tactics to achieve its end.
In sum, I think that the charge of Hayekian socialism carries with
it a certain reluctant accuracy, because Hayek did not see the close
intellectual and institutional connections between the government in-
terventions that he supported and those which he opposed. In part,
79. For a recent example of the endless delays that planning can introduce into land
development, see Landgate, Inc. v. California Coastal Commission, 953 P.2d 1188, 1204 (Cal.
1998) (holding that a two-year delay by a government agency in issuing a building permit
to a landowner did not constitute a compensable taking and noting that "[a] Ithough [the
landowner] was in the unfortunate position of suffering from a delay not of its own mak-
ing, the same can be said of any governmental mistake"). For a general discussion of the
risks, see WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS: LAW, ECONOMICS, AND POLITICS 9
(1995) (suggesting that, among other risks, land use regulations can "transfer economic
value from one class of property owners to another, typically from owners of land with
development potential to owners of already-developed properties").
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Hayek made this mistake because of the political circumstances of his
own time. In order to slay the dragon of central planning, he thought
it imperative to concede some points to the opposition. But a second
reason is at work as well, and it brings us back to the philosophical
origins of the Hayekian position. The central feature of Hayekian
thought was its reliance on ignorance. It is ignorance that makes cen-
tral planning fail. It is ignorance that gives local knowledge its real
bite. It is ignorance that leads us to embrace a conception of subjec-
tive value.
I value my ignorance as much as the next fellow. But truth be
known, Hayek has gotten his central philosophical point only partly
right. He overstates the level of ignorance that we have, and thus un-
derestimates the dangers of government intervention driven by knowl-
edge of partisan advantage. It may well be that I cannot draw the
demand curve for my new widget, or anticipate any of the thousands
of events that will determine its price; but I do know that there are few
states of the world in which I am better off without my protected mo-
nopoly than with it. And ignorant, though I may be, I will be pre-
pared to invest a good deal in securing that legal protection if allowed
to do so by the rules of the game. With partial knowledge I can put
self-interest to work in the political sphere just as I can put it to work
in the economic sphere. Truth be known, that is where Hayek goes
wrong. We (collectively) may not know enough to manage a complex
economic system from the center, but we (individually) do know
enough to seek to rig the rules of the game to cut in our favor. Imper-
fect information coupled with confined self-interest offers a better set
of behavioral assumptions about individual actors and social
processes. Once we make those assumptions, we must be aware of the
dangers that come from interferences with contractual freedom and
with legal efforts to maintain, from the center, minimum levels of se-
curity for us all. These ideals may sound fine in the abstract, but in
practice they confer too much power on government bureaucrats and
often invite private behaviors that ape many of the worst characteris-
tics of the central planning that Hayek rightly deplored. The
Hayekian critique applies to the Hayekian concessions on minimum
welfare rights. In that important sense, the charge of Hayekian social-
ism sticks.
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